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Abstract
The recent push for environmental regulation has invigorated the discus-
sion of mechanism design and optimal taxation policy. Recent decades
have also seen growing interest in behavioural economics and empirically
based theory. In this thesis we take a step towards combining the two by
asking how a regulator may correct an externality in situations where they
have a time consistency problem.
Time inconsistency is one of the notable developments of behavioural
economics. It posits that an agent’s decisions do not remain consistent
over time, which causes a utility loss if the agent cannot commit them-
selves to a particular course of action and stick to it. The solution to in-
consistency problems is to precommit to a course of action and prevent
future deviations from it. However, finding a mechanism to enable such
precommitment is often problematic.
A regulator who maximises welfare can have a time consistency prob-
lem because welfare will depend on the decisions of firm and households
who may themselves be inconsistent. That inconsistency then propagates
to the regulator’s decision and reduces the level of welfare that the regula-
tor can reach. Alternatively, the regulator’s time consistency problem can
be caused by non-stationarity in their time preferences. To reach the first-
best outcome the regulator must not only eliminate the environmental ex-
ternality: they must also overcome their own time inconsistency problem.
This thesis draws from the literature on strategic delegation to con-
struct a taxation game in which the regulator can achieve the first best tax-
ation regime without the need for external precommitment devices. We
study a dynamic game where the regulator chooses a tax rate and the reg-
ulated monopolist chooses their price. We show that the Markov-perfect
equilibrium price path of this game will replicate the first best plan. Our
results holds for time inconsistency caused by both jump states and quasi-
hyperbolic discounting.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Environmental protection has become the political cause ce´le`bre of the
twenty-first century. Politicians in the European Union and New Zealand
alike are scrambling to seize the moral high ground on the issue of envi-
ronmental regulation. For many countries, the idea of a tax on pollution
is very attractive, both economically and politically. In this context it is
opportune to examine any difficulties that may arise in the creation of op-
timal regulatory schemes.
Economists have long recognised the problems posed by externalities.
There is a large body of literature on regulation that is designed to over-
come the negative externality imposed on society by polluters. One mech-
anism features prominently in the environmental literature is taxation.
Pigouvian taxation is not only theoretically effective for mitigating ex-
ternalities; it is also a mechanism that is relatively easy for regulators to
implement. Most governments already have various taxes in place, so cre-
ating a pollution tax is a task for which the administrative infrastructure
already exists.
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Unfortunately, governments can face certain difficulties in implement-
ing efficient taxation. This thesis will examine regulating an industry where
agents exhibit dynamically inconsistent behaviour. In such an industry, a
regulator who maximises some welfare function that accounts for indus-
try profits will find that his policies may also suffer from time consistency
problems. If the government cannot precommit to future taxes, it will be
unable to achieve the first-best outcome for society. We propose a taxation
mechanism which allows the regulator to overcome his dynamic inconsis-
tency problem, and thus realise the first-best regulatory outcome.
Chapter 2 canvasses the theoretical framework of dynamic inconsis-
tency that underlies the proposed mechanism. Chapter 3 constructs a
model of a polluting monopolist producing a durable good and a regu-
lator attempting to address the pollution problem. This model is used to
demonstrate the that the inability of the regulator to precommit to future
actions will prevent him from achieving the first-best outcome. Chapter
4 describes the proposed Pigouvian taxation mechanism. The method by
which it overcomes the dynamic inconsistency problem and implements
efficiency is explained. Since the model does not permit a closed-form
solution, we develop a numerical example in chapter 5 to investigate the
effect of parameter variations.
Chapter 2
Theoretical framework
The following section discusses the theoretical framework of the thesis.
The game theoretic context of the problem is explained, as is the reason
for choosing to focus on the regulation of pollution.
Section 2.1 briefly covers the theory of dynamic games and specifies
the type of games that will be considered. Section 2.2 explores the notion
of dynamic inconsistency. Here the type of dynamic inconsistency that
affects the model in chapter 3 will be delineated. Section 2.3 surveys the
types of situations such inconsistency problems may occur.
The innovation of this thesis is to design a taxation mechanism that will
aid a government which regulates a polluter while experiencing dynamic
inconsistency. The aim is to show that this regulator can use taxes as an
instrument that provides polluters with efficient incentives even when his
welfare maximisation problem contains a jump variable.
3
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2.1 Dynamic games
2.1.1 Features of dynamic games
Static game theory studies the interaction of strategic agents in a so-called
‘one-shot’ framework. Each player makes a one-time decision, and there
is no future play. Such games can be described as static, since they do not
have any dynamic element. In reality, many important decisions occur in
the context of ongoing relationships. As a result, the idea of a repeated
game (also called a supergame) was developed.
In a repeated game, the one-shot game is played multiple times by the
same players. These games may produce results unobtainable in static
games (e.g. cooperation in the infinite horizon Prisoners’ Dilemma). How-
ever, they cannot capture some important features of many observed rela-
tionships, because the context of the play is the same in every period. In
real life, it is often the case that one’s actions today affect one’s possible
future actions, and thus potential future payoffs. Repeated games do not
acocunt for such inter-temporal linkages. It is these interactions that dy-
namic games seek to model. In this thesis, the term ‘dynamic game’ will
refer to games with state dynamics. Repeated games are not within the
ambit of dynamic games as the term is used here.
A dynamic game is modelled as a dynamical system in which the state
of the world changes over time in response to players’ actions. The state
variables describe the current state of the system. They may influence
the payoffs, or the action space, of the players. The state changes over
time according to a pre-defined law of motion, which may depend upon
the players’ actions. In such a system, players’ current actions will affect
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their future payoffs through the state. In addition to the standard static
strategic effects, these settings allow for the possibility of inter-temporal
strategic effects. Sometimes they also give rise to intra-personal, inter-
temporal strategic effects: an agent may have a conflict with their future
‘self’.
In general, the most popular solution concept in games is that of Nash
equilibrium. In dynamic games, various refinements are used to rule out
Nash equilibria that may be considered implausible. A couple of these
will be explained later in this chapter.
2.1.2 Open loop vs feedback strategies
There are two common ways to model players’ behaviour in a dynamic
game: players could either precommit up front to their future course of
action, or they could choose their action in each period based on the cur-
rent state. The former strategies are known as open loop strategies, as they
are non-responsive to changes in the state. The latter strategies are called
feedback strategies, because a change in the state can affect the player’s
actions.
An equilibrium in open loop strategies is justifiable only if players have
precommitment power. Indeed, in an open loop equilibrium, players will
not change their action in response to deviations from the equilibrium by
other players. Essentially, open loop games are static games with a multi-
dimensional action space: instead of choosing one action, at the beginning
of time the players choose actions for all periods.
In open loop equilibria, players choose their future actions, while tak-
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ing the future actions of their opponents as given. Constructing strategies
in this fashion means that the prescribed actions will often be sub-optimal
if the state variable deviates from the anticipated equilibrium path. Thus,
open loop strategies are generally not subgame perfect: they will not be
optimal in all possible subgames.
When modelling a situation in which players have the ability to re-
spond to deviations of the state, or in other players’ strategies, it is more
appropriate to consider feedback strategies. This approach specifies the
player’s strategy as a decision rule, i.e. a function of the state. It is com-
puted while taking as given the decision rules of the other players. Be-
cause such strategies are optimal for all possible states, by construction
they will be subgame perfect.
2.1.3 State variables
Unlike other types of games, in dynamic games players’ payoffs can be
affected by state variables which change over time. The choice of state
variables is an important modelling decision that can have a marked effect
upon the outcome of the game.
There are two important types of state variables: first, those that have
a direct physical or technological impact upon the game and, secondly,
those that affects the psychology of agents and, through it, their behaviour.
The first type includes components of the game structure that affect play-
ers’ payoffs directly, such as pollution stock levels. The second type in-
cludes variables that are not payoff-relevant, such as the history of play.
In repeated games, the Folk Theorem establishes that there exist a mul-
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tiplicity of equilibria, provided that players have long memories (Fuden-
berg and Maskin, 1986). Current research demonstrates that the same re-
sult holds for dynamic games in which strategies are allowed to depend
on state variables that are not payoff-relevant (Haurie and Pohlohja, 1987;
Ausubel and Deneckere, 1989; Gul et al., 1986) . The reason is that equilib-
rium behaviour is influenced by agents’ beliefs about the consequences of
deviations from the equilibrium path. Including state variables that affect
players’ psyche, such as the history of play, can give rise to many possible
belief structures. This will result in multiplicity of equilibria. Because it is
difficult to draw economic conclusions without a unique prediction, it is
common to restrict the state variables to those which directly affect play-
ers’ payoffs. This restriction does not guarantee a unique equilibrium, but
it does reduce the number of possible equilibria.
2.1.4 Markov strategies
Strategies that are based on information sets which include only payoff-
relevant information are known as Markov strategies. The assumption
of Markov strategies implies that players are unable to observe events
that happened in the deep past. The history of play is thus summarised
through its effect upon the state variables.
When players’ past actions are not directly observable, it is difficult to
punish past deviations from the equilibrium. Effectively, the restriction
to Markov strategies rules out the use of trigger strategies. The range of
potential equilibria is therefore significantly narrowed.
While Markov strategies offer a way to limit the number of possible
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equilibria, they may not always be appropriate. For the Markovian restric-
tion to be reasonable, players must be unlikely to use trigger strategies.
In the regulation games studied here, we claim that players are unlikely
to use trigger strategies. It seems implausible that a government would
choose to punish a firm for deviations from the desired output level by
taxing it for many periods in the future. When governments choose their
tax rules, they enshrine them in legislation. The tax authority then applies
the tax rule as specified in the legislation. Since the creation of the rule
and its application are usually separate activities, taxation rules are un-
likely to be reactionary. Governments also prefer to appear even-handed
in their policies. A trigger strategy relies on the threat of harsh punish-
ments to enforce an efficient equilibrium. Given that a deviation from the
equilibrium output level is not illegal, it is unlikely that the government
would wish to punish a firm for such a deviation. It is more reasonable to
believe that the level of taxation will depend on the current state of the in-
dustry, but not upon the firms’ history of actions. Thus, the use of Markov
strategies in this thesis seems justified.
2.2 Dynamic consistency
2.2.1 Dynamic consistency and precommitment
The extension of game theory to dynamic games opened up a range of
interesting new problems. Among those problems is the issue of dynamic
consistency, which was first explored in the context of economic policy by
Kydland and Prescott (1977). A plan is said to be dynamically consistent
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if a player has no incentive to deviate from it at any time in the future.
Conversely, a dynamically inconsistent plan is one which, while optimal
when conceived, the player will choose to deviate from in the future.
A dynamically inconsistent agent will be unable to adhere to an opti-
mal plan without the aid of some precommitment device. Some of these
devices are usually enforced by a third party. On a personal level, people
rely on family members and friends to help them follow a chosen course
of action; on a business level, the legal system enforces contractual com-
mitments. However, precommitment power is harder to come by when
there is no external ‘enforcer’ available. Governments, in particular, may
find it very difficult to bind themselves, since any legislation that they pass
can be overturned by future legislators. This thesis will examine the prob-
lem of a dynamically inconsistent regulator in some detail and propose a
method by which a regulator can overcome their dynamic inconsistency.
2.2.2 Time-consistency and perfection
If precommitment is not possible, then an equilibrium involving dynam-
ically inconsistent strategies is implausible. No agent will be willing to
rely upon promises that they expect to be broken. Hence, strategies must
be dynamically consistent to generate plausible equilibria. We now ex-
amine in greater detail precisely what is meant by dynamic consistency.
There are two ideas of dynamic consistency that are relevant to this thesis:
‘time-consistency’ and ‘subgame perfection’.
Time-consistency is the weaker of the two requirements. Any equilib-
rium that is not dynamically inconsistent is time consistent. Given that no
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agent has reneged in the past, and none are expected to renege in the fu-
ture, no agent has an incentive to unilaterally renege on a time-consistent
equilibrium.
A subgame perfect equilibrium must satisfy a more stringent test. sub-
game perfection requires that a strategy be optimal regardless of past de-
viations in either the state or in the other players’ actions. This must be
true for all possible values of the state variable and across all time periods.
As such, a perfect strategy will usually depend on the state variable.
Open loop strategies are announced by agents at the beginning of the
game, and so describe actions as functions of time and the initial state.
Thus, a deviation from the expected path by any player will not change the
actions dictated by an open loop strategy. This is likely to cause the open
loop strategy to be sub-optimal in the periods following the deviation.
Therefore, the player will have an incentive to deviate from it. It follows
that the open loop strategy is not subgame perfect. Note that the strategy
may still be time-consistent even if it is not dynamically inconsistent, as
long as play remains on the equilibrium path.
In dynamic games, subgame perfection may be attained with state-
dependent, feedback strategies. Since perfection implies time-consistency
(even though the converse is not true), a perfect feedback strategy will also
be time consistent. Hence, time-consistent strategies can be either open
loop or feedback.
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2.2.3 Sufficient conditions for time-consistency
Feedback strategies are designed to be optimal in all states. Thus, an equi-
librium in feedback strategies is subgame perfect by construction. Open
loop equilibria are rarely subgame perfect, but are often time-consistent
along the equilibrium path. Bellman’s Principle of Optimality states that
the continuation of an optimal strategy is optimal in all states that arise
from past optimal behaviour (Bellman, 1957). Thus, if the initial state is
exogenously given, and players all choose optimal strategies, the result-
ing equilibrium will be time-consistent (Karp and Newbery, 1993).
The difficulty with this result is that it depends upon an exogenously
specified initial state. If the initial state is not exogenous, then the cur-
rent state must be a function of future actions. A variable whose value
depends upon future events is known as a ‘jump variable’. Problems with
jump variables are not covered by the Principle of Optimality and rarely
have time-consistent open loop solutions. However, the absence of a jump
variable is sufficient to ensure time-consistency of an open loop equilib-
rium.
The intuition behind the above statement is fairly straightforward. The
presence of a jump variable suggests that the current state and the cur-
rent payoff depend upon expectations about the future. Thus, in period
t, agents need to form expectations about actions and payoffs in period
t + n, so that they can compute their optimal action. Time inconsistency
can arise in two ways: first, if these expectations are not fulfilled then the
period t action becomes sub-optimal, and so the period t + n action will
be different from what was anticipated. Even if expectations are fulfilled,
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the period t+n action is still likely to differ from the expected action. This
is because the t + n action has an effect upon the period t payoff. Re-
optimising in period t+n would disregard the ‘inter-temporal externality’
on the previous periods’ payoffs, since they are now sunk. Thus, in period
t + n, the optimal action is unlikely to be the same as was expected in pe-
riod t. As a result, the open loop equilibrium calculated in period t will be
time inconsistent.
Dynamic inconsistency is common in settings where governments reg-
ulate non-strategic but forward looking agents (Chari et al., 1988). When
making decisions about the current period, such agents take future pay-
offs into consideration. If current payoffs are affected by future actions,
then the problem of a subsequent regulator will differ from that of the cur-
rent one. This implies that the regulator’s optimal plan will change over
time, and so the regulator will be dynamically inconsistent.
2.2.4 Implications of dynamic inconsistency for regulation
The problem considered in this thesis will exhibit dynamic inconsistency
due to the presence of a jump variable in the regulator’s objective function.
As a result of this, the regulator is unable to obtain the first-best price
path. In the subsequent chapters, we will focus on this inefficiency. But
before describing the specifics of the model, it is worth canvassing the
likely consequences for a dynamically inconsistent regulator. Note that the
assumptions in the following paragraphs are made purely for exposition
purposes. All assumptions underlying the formal model will be explicitly
stated in chapter 3.
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Imagine that the regulator’s objective function includes a jump vari-
able. That is, welfare depends upon the regulator’s future actions. In each
period, the regulator chooses the rate of a tax that is imposed on a pol-
luter. If the tax rate is expected to fall in the next period, the polluter will
inter-temporally substitute away from current production towards future
production; hence, production in the current period will decrease. Sup-
pose that the fall in the current period’s profits and consumer surplus out-
weighs the decrease in pollution. Then the current period’s welfare will
decrease. To prevent this, the regulator must commit to setting high taxes
in future periods. The expectation of high future taxes would remove the
incentive of the polluter for inter-temporal substitution. However, once
these future periods arrive, the regulator will no longer be concerned with
the effect of his tax choice upon past welfare. Thus, the regulator would
revise the tax downward if they have the opportunity to do that.
A sophisticated regulator will anticipate future temptations to decrease
taxes. If they are unable to commit to future policies, they will set the cur-
rent tax strategically to counter future incentives for tax reductions. They
achieve that by setting a low current tax rate. The essence of the problem
is that the polluter is under-producing in the current period, relative to the
future period. This problem can be corrected by decreasing current taxa-
tion to remove the incentive to shift production to the future. As a result,
a sophisticated regulator who is unable to precommit will under-tax the
polluter relative to the social optimum.
Under-taxation of a polluter implies over-pollution. Since pollution
and its consequences are some of the most pressing problems facing mod-
ern industrialised societies, designing an effective mechanism to control it
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is a problem of great importance. Correcting a potential policy flaw that
could lead to significant over-pollution is far more than an academic exer-
cise.
2.3 Causes of regulatory dynamic inconsistency
2.3.1 Inconsistency of the welfare function
A regulator’s welfare function consists of four components: firms’ prof-
its, consumer surplus, externalities and government revenue. For now,
revenues will be ignored. We abstract from them in order to focus on cor-
rective, rather than revenue gathering, regulation.
In a regulated industry that exhibits dynamic inconsistency, firms’ prof-
its will often contain a jump variable. It is also possible that consumer sur-
plus may contain a jump variable, provided that the inconsistency in the
industry is caused by demand-side behaviour. Jump variables in either of
these functions can cause the regulator’s welfare function to exhibit incon-
sistency.
Note that inconsistency in the profit function will not always be trans-
ferred to welfare: if the jump variable is in the inverse demand function
alone, and firms’ revenues are simply a transfer from consumers to firms,
then the jump variable will not appear in welfare. However, this will not
be true if the regulator weighs profits and consumer surplus differently.
In this case, expectations about future variables will still be present in the
welfare function and the regulator will be inconsistent.
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2.3.2 Industries in which dynamic inconsistency arises
There are numerous examples of industries where dynamic inconsistency
arises from a jump variable in a firm’s profit function. Most commonly, it
is found where durable or addictive goods are being produced, or where
an exhaustible resource is being extracted.
Exhaustible resources
Economists have been interested in exhaustible resources since Harold
Hotelling’s seminal paper (Hotelling, 1931). In this paper, Hotelling shows
that the pricing of an exhaustible resource depends upon expectations of
subsequent prices. This dependence upon future decisions introduces a
jump variable the profits of firms who utilise the resource. In particu-
lar, Karp and Newbery (1993) show that a firm with monopsony power
who purchases an exhaustible resource will be dynamically inconsistent if
they face either a competitive fringe of consumers, or increasing extraction
costs.
Addictive goods
The theory of rational addiction suggests that an addictive good can be
modelled as a commodity whose current consumption increases the marginal
benefit of future consumption (Becker and Murphy, 1988). If expected fu-
ture prices are low, then consumption is affected in two ways. First, ex-
pected future consumption will rise as a direct result of the lower expected
price. Secondly, current consumption will rise as consumers attempt to in-
crease the benefits that they will reap from the low future prices. Thus,
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a firm selling an addictive good can affect current demand by manipulat-
ing expectations about its future pricing strategy. This introduces a jump
variable into the firm’s profit function and causes the firm to act in a dy-
namically inconsistent fashion.
Durable goods
A durable good is one which is not consumed instantly, but continues to
provide value for an extended period of time. When an individual decides
to purchase a durable good they must weigh the benefit of purchasing in
the current period against possible price reductions if they delay purchase
until a later period. A firm selling durable goods, like a firm selling ad-
dictive goods, can influence the current period’s profit by manipulating
consumers’ expectations about future prices. A high expected future price
will induce more consumers to buy in the current period. The future price
is a jump variable in the firm’s profit function and induces dynamic incon-
sistency.
Chapter 3
Problem
The problem of regulating a dynamically inconsistent polluter is compli-
cated: a regulator seeking to maximise social welfare will have to take
into account the dynamic structure of consumer demand for the polluter’s
product. This implies that instantaneous welfare will contain a jump vari-
able and hence the polluter’s time consistency problem will be transferred
to the regulator. In the absence of precommitment devices a regulator
faced with a dynamically inconsistent polluter may be unable to attain the
first-best outcome. A likely consequence of this failure is over-pollution.
This chapter presents a model of a polluting durable goods monopoly
and shows how its regulation may be subject to time inconsistency. We
will characterise both the first-best (precommitment) and the second-best
(time-consistent) regulatory outcomes. They will then be used as bench-
marks for the proposed taxation mechanism in the next chapter.
17
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3.1 A model of a dynamically inconsistent regu-
lator
In each situation described in section 2.3.2, a regulator will be affected by
the dynamic inconsistency of the regulated firm. In this chapter we set up
a model to illustrate the problem. We will focus on the specific case of a
durable goods producer, which will serve to illustrate how our proposal
can overcome the regulatory problems induced by jump states.
In this section we elucidate the model and describe the players’ de-
cisions and interactions. The main decision makers are a regulator and
a monopolist who supplies an infinitely durable good to a mass of con-
sumers. We consider a durable goods producer because their behaviour is
known to produce dynamic inconsistency (see section 2.3.2).
3.1.1 The consumption decision
The monopolist produces an infinitely durable good, which is then sup-
plied to a mass of consumers. For simplicity this mass is normalised to 1.
The period-t price is denoted by pt. Each consumer can buy only one unit
of the good in their lifetime. After the purchase they withdraw from the
market, but continue to enjoy a stream of benefits v ∈ [0, 1] in perpetuity.
Future benefits are discounted by a factor β.1
The taste parameter, v, indicates an individual consumer’s valuation of
the good. Consumers are assumed to have heterogeneous valuations and
their tastes are distributed across the population according to a probabil-
1The parameter β can also capture depreciation of the benefits of the durable good.
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ity density function φ(v), which has a corresponding cumulative density
function (CDF) denoted by Φ(v). We assume that φ(v) is everywhere pos-
itive.
Price trajectory
Consumers decide the timing of their purchases. Those who are most ea-
ger will be willing to pay a premium to buy the good early on. Hence,
initially the price of the good will be high. As the early adopters leave the
market the price of the good will be reduced in order to entice the remain-
ing consumers to make a purchase. Consequently, the equilibrium price
path will be decreasing over time.
It must be noted that it may not be optimal for the monopolist to op-
erate in all periods. As Stokey originally showed, a monopolist with con-
stant marginal costs and precommitment power will choose to produce
only in the first period (Coase, 1972; Stokey, 1981). Two key features of the
model studied here distinguish it from Stokey’s:
1. the monopolist does not have precommitment power; and,
2. the monopolist has convex costs (assumption 2).
As shown by Kahn (1986), the presence of either of these properties
invalidates Stokey’s result. Convexity of costs implies that higher produc-
tion will increase marginal costs, and thus it induces the monopolist to
smooth production over time costs. Kahn shows that, in an infinite hori-
zon setting, the monopolist’s production smoothing will cause them to
asymptotically approach a steady-state price. Thus, the good’s price se-
quence is Cauchy and converges to a limit (i.e. a steady state price) as
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t→∞:
pt−1 − pt ≥ pt − pt+1 ∀ t (3.1)
This dynamic stability condition constrains the price trajectory in the mar-
ket under consideration.
Consumers’ intertemporal trade-offs
In a durable goods market the consumer’s main decision is when to pur-
chase. Knowing that the price will decline over time, they weigh the bene-
fit of purchasing in the current period against the expected price reduction
of the subsequent period. If the expected cost reduction from waiting until
the next period outweighs the foregone v, they will delay purchase.
The lifetime net benefit, V t, of purchasing in period-t is the net present
value of the stream of discounted benefits, minus the cost of purchase:
V t =
v
1− β − p
t. (3.2)
Similarly,
V t+1 =
βv
1− β − βp
t+1
e , (3.3)
where pt+1e is the anticipated future price. Thus, purchase will be delayed
in period-t if
V t+1 > V t. (3.4)
Substituting (3.2) and (3.3) in to (3.4) gives
v < pt − βpt+1e . (3.5)
By shifting equations (3.3) and (3.2) back one period and performing a
similar rearrangement, one finds that purchase will be delayed in period-
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t− 1 if
v < pt−1 − βpt. (3.6)
Suppose that consumers have rational expectations: pt+1e = pt. Then
a consumer who chooses not to delay purchase in the current period will
never prefer to consume in a later period. This can be seen by combining
equation (3.1) with β < 1 and shifting it forward one period to give pt −
pt+1 > β(pt+1 − pt+2), which rearranges to
pt − βpt+1 > pt+1 − βpt+2. (3.7)
Equation (3.4) implies that all consumers who choose to buy in the current
period have tastes such that v ≥ pt − βpt+1e . Hence,
v ≥ pt − βpt+1 > pt+1 − βpt+2 > . . . > pT−1 − βpT , ∀T > t, (3.8)
and each consumer who buys the good in period-t will be worse off de-
laying the purchase to any future period.
The demand function
The above discussion of consumer behaviour enables us to obtain the de-
mand function for a given period t. Current demand is the mass of people
who chose to delay purchase in the previous period but choose not to de-
lay from the current period to the next. Combining the equations describ-
ing consumer choice with the CDF of v gives us the mass of consumers
who purchase in period t. The resulting demand is
xt = x(pt−1, pt, pt+1e ) =
{
Φ(pt−1 − βpt)− Φ(pt − βpt+1e ) if t > 0,
1− Φ(p0 − βp1e) if t = 0.
(3.9)
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Since the function Φ(·) is a CDF, it must be increasing. Equation (3.7) im-
plies that Φ(pt−1 − βpt) > Φ(pt − βpt+1e ), so demand will be positive in all
periods. Furthermore, we require that the demand function to be concave
in both the current and future prices. This, along with Assumption 2 —
introduced in section 3.1.2 — will guarantee the concavity of profits.2
Assumption 1. The demand function function, xt, satisfies ∂
2xt
∂(pt)2
≤ 0,
∂2xt
∂(pt+1e )2
≤ 0.
3.1.2 The production decision
Suppose that the monopolist incurs operating costs C(xt). Thus, his profit
function is
pit = pi(pt−1, pt, pt+1e ) = p
tx(pt−1, pt, pt+1e )− C
(
x(pt−1, pt, pt+1e )
)
. (3.10)
To ensure concavity of instantaneous profits, it is necessary to assume con-
vexity of the cost function. As discussed above, this also implies that a
monopolist who is able to precommit will not cease production after the
first period (Kahn, 1986).
Assumption 2. The monopolist’s cost function satisfies C ′′(xt) > 0.
Along with Assumption 1 this assumption guarantees that profits will
be concave in both the present price and next period’s price: ∂
2pit
∂(pt)2
≤ 0,
∂2pit
∂(pt+1e )2
≤ 0. See Appendix A for a proof.
2Note that these conditions are sufficient for concavity. We do not demonstrate that
they are necessary.
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3.1.3 The regulator’s decision
We assume that the regulator seeks to maximise social welfare. They take
in to account the monopolist’s profit, the consumer surplus, and potential
externalities arising from production. In the partial equilibrium model
studied here, the consumer surplus considered is solely the net benefit
gained by consumers from purchasing the monopolist’s good. The partial
equilibrium nature of this model makes it difficult to speak accurately of
welfare but we use it as a convenient approximation, having noted that
this is not a true welfare analysis. Consumer surplus is given by
CSt = CS(pt−1, pt, pt+1e ) (3.11)
=
∫ pt−1−βpt
pt−βpt+1e
φ(v)(v − pt) dv +
∫ 1
pt−1−βpt
φ(v)v dv (3.12)
= E(v − pt|pt − βpt+1e ≤ v < pt−1 − βpt) + E(v|v ≥ pt−1 − βpt).
(3.13)
In addition to consumer surplus and profits, the regulator must also
consider the environmental impact of pollution generated by production.
Our setting assumes that pollution is a flow, rather than a stock, external-
ity. That is, instead of modelling pollution as a stock of harm that accumu-
lates over time, we consider harm that is caused by the polluter’s current
production. In other words, we assume that the level of emissions is an
increasing function, ψ(xt), of current output. Specifically, the pollution
function satisfies the following condition.
Assumption 3. The pollution function satisfies ψ′(xt) > 0 and ψ(0) = 0.
Such an assumption is plausible for some, but not all, types of pollu-
tion. Some pollutants are quickly dispersed and may have little time to
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accumulate. Thus, it can be reasonably modelled as a flow externality. Ex-
amples of these are particulate emissions and volatile organic compounds.
Heavy metals and greenhouse gasses, in contrast, can accumulate in the
soil and eventually reach harmful levels. It would be more suitable to con-
sider them as stock pollutants. Either approach is valid for a subset of pol-
lution problems. We have chosen flow pollution because the framework
facilitates simple analysis of time inconsistent regulation.
Our assumptions yield the following instantaneous welfare function:
wt = w(pt−1, pt, pt+1e ) (3.14)
= CS(pt−1, pt, pt+1e ) + pi(p
t−1, pt, pt+1e )− ψ
(
x(pt−1, pt, pt+1e )
)
(3.15)
=
∫ 1
pt−βpt+1e
φ(v)v dv − C(x(pt−1, pt, pt+1e ))− ψ(x(pt−1, pt, pt+1e )). (3.16)
Given rational expectations (pt+1e = pt), the above definition implies the
presence of a jump variable in the regulator’s objective function. As ar-
gued in section 2.2.3 this may cause a time consistency problem for the
regulator.
3.2 Laissez-faire performance
Having described the agents in the market and their interactions, we now
turn to the topic of efficiency. It could be that this market is already ef-
ficient. It is also possible that the regulator may not be able to improve
on the free market outcome. The first step in assessing any government
intervention is to characterise the performance of the unregulated market.
Then in section 3.3.2 we will compare the laissez faire outcome to the reg-
ulator’s benchmark pricing policies.
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3.2.1 The monopolist’s price path
As already established, the monopolist’s demand function is
xt = Φ(pt−1 − βpt)− Φ(pt − βpt+1e ). (3.17)
It generates the following instantaneous profit function:
pi(pt−1, pt, pt+1e ) = p
t
[
Φ(pt−1 − βpt)− Φ(pt − βpt+1e )
]
− C (Φ(pt−1 − βpt)− Φ(pt − βpt+1e )) . (3.18)
The monopolist’s objective is maximization of lifetime profits. Suppose
that his discount factor is δ. To get an interior equilibrium, we assume that
β < δ < 1.
The presence of a jump state, pt+1e , suggests that profit maximization
will give rise to a time inconsistency problem for the monopolist. This
problem can be conceptualised as a strategic conflict between the mo-
nopolist’s current and future ‘selves’. We will model the time consistent
sequence of decisions as the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a
dynamic ‘intrapersonal’ game. This game is played by different agents,
each a temporal incarnation of the monopolist associated with a particu-
lar time period. These temporal ‘selves’ choose prices to maximise their
payoffs while accounting for the discrepancy between their interests and
those of future agents. In that our agents are ‘sophisticated’ in the sense of
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001).
Our analysis will focus on a particular type of subgame perfect equi-
librium. Namely, we consider the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the mo-
nopolist’s intrapersonal game. This solution concept restricts the players’
strategies to be functions of the current state: pt = g(pt−1). The Markovian
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approach allows us to use dynamic programming techniques to charac-
terise the equilibrium. It assumes away history-dependent punishments
with trigger strategies.
Furthermore, we need to specify how current agents form expectations
about the behaviour of future players. Stokey (1981) shows that rational
expectations are not sufficient to prevent a multiplicity of equilibria simi-
lar to that of the Folk Theorem. To avoid this multiplicity, we assume that
decision makers have perfect rational expectations. That is, we require ex-
pectations of future prices to be correct both on and off the equilibrium
path. The restriction to Markovian strategies and perfect rational expecta-
tions imply that pt+1e = g(pt).
If the monopolist does not have precommitment power and follows a
Markov strategy g(p), then his optimal decision rule must solve the Bell-
man equation
Π(pt−1) = max
pt
{
pi
(
pt−1, pt, g(pt)
)
+ δΠ(pt)
}
. (3.19)
This equation recursively defines each player’s lifetime payoff, as cap-
tured by the value function Π(p), in terms of future players’ lifetime pay-
offs. That is, the current player’s equilibrium lifetime payoff is the max-
imised value of his instantaneous payoff from his decision, plus the an-
ticipated continuation payoff of tomorrow’s decision. Furthermore, the
optimal pricing strategy is time invariant, implying that
g(pt−1) = arg max
pt
{
pi
(
pt−1, pt, g(pt)
)
+ δΠ(pt)
}
. (3.20)
In Appendix B we use dynamic programming techniques to charac-
terise the Markov-perfect equilibrium. Differentiation yields a first-order
CHAPTER 3. PROBLEM 27
condition and an envelope condition. Combining these delivers a gener-
alised Euler-Lagrange equation
pit2 + pi
t
3g
t+1
1 + δpi
t+1
1 = 0, (3.21)
where the subscript i denotes the partial derivative with respect to the
function’s i-th argument.3 This difference-differential equation implicitly
characterises the price path that will be chosen in equilibrium. The first
term of this equation reflects the direct effect of pt on the profit function.
The second term encapsulates the effect of pt on pit via the strategy choice,
g(pt), of the subsequent agent. The final term captures the discounted ef-
fect of the current action on future profits. Optimality requires that these
effects sum to 0.
3.2.2 Inefficiency of the laissez-faire outcome
Next we investigate whether the laissez-faire price path derived in section
3.2.1 provides a rationale for government intervention. The definitive an-
swer to this question requires characterising the regulatory equilibrium.
Intuitively, our setting exhibits a number of inefficiencies which suggest
that regulation may improve welfare. First, the market is served by a
monopolist. When a producer has market power, he usually tends pro-
duce too little and charge a price above the efficient level. Second, produc-
tion causes a negative externality as pollution is released. Such externali-
ties may imply overproduction relative to the first-best outcome. Finally,
the monopolist’s profit function contains a jump variable. Section 2.2.3
showed how this may create a time consistency problem for the producer.
3For example, pit2 = ∂pi(pt−1, pt, pt+1)/∂pt.
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This problem may induce the monopolist to increase production, further
exacerbating potential overprovision of the durable good.
The three welfare effects mentioned above act in different directions.
Monopoly power pushes the price above efficiency. Conversely, pollution
and the monopolist’s time consistency problem tend to reduce the price
below the efficient level. We cannot predict the net effect without knowl-
edge of market specifics. It may even be possible for the three inefficiencies
to exactly cancel each other out. However, as section 3.3.2 discusses, it is
unlikely that the laissez-faire price will replicate the efficient path. Since
we do not exclude the possibility of a negative tax (i.e. a subsidy), there is
no need to assume that a particular type of inefficiency is dominant. The
proposal described in Chapter 4 will still yield the first-best outcome.
3.3 Benchmarking regulatory performance
To evaluate the regulatory intervention proposed in Chapter 4, we first
need to study the price paths attainable by a regulator. For the purpose of
benchmarking we assume that in each period the regulator has direct con-
trol the price of the durable good. Such equilibria would arise in standard
models of Pigouvian taxation (Benchekroun and Long, 1997).
This section characterises two benchmark plans,
1. the first-best price path where the regulator can commit to future
prices; and,
2. the second-best price path where the regulator is unable to commit
to future prices.
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3.3.1 First-best price plan
Deriving the plan
The regulator’s first-best price path is the plan he would choose in the first
period if at that time he could precommit to a complete sequence of future
prices. Given rational expectations, (pt+1e = pt+1), this plan can be obtained
as the open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) of the problem
max
pt
∞∑
t=1
δt−1wt(pt−1, pt, pt+1), (3.22)
where pt is the price vector pt = {pt}∞t=1. The solution to this problem is a
sequence of prices, indexed by time, that maximises the net present value
of total welfare.
The optimal precommitment price path, pt, satisfies the first-order con-
ditions
wt2 + δw
t+1
1 = 0, t = 1 (3.23)
wt−13 + δw
t
2 + δ
2wt+11 = 0, t ≥ 2. (3.24)
The above equations are obtained by differentiating period-1 lifetime wel-
fare with respect to the period-1 price p1 and an arbitrary future price pt,
t > 1. Since these prices solve an unconstrained maximisation problem,
they attain the highest possible net present value of welfare.
Substituting the derivatives of instantaneous welfare (3.14) into (3.23)
and (3.24) yields equivalent conditions expressed in terms of monopoly
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profit, consumer surplus and pollution costs.
pit2 + CS
t
1 − ψt2 + δ
[
pit+11 + CS
t+1
1 − ψt+11
]
= 0
(3.25)
pit−13 + CS
t−1
3 − ψt−13 + δ
[
pit2 + CS
t
2 − ψt2
]
+ δ2
[
pit+11 + CS
t+1
1 − ψt+11
]
= 0
(3.26)
Dynamic inconsistency of the first-best plan
As already argued, the presence of a jump variable in the instantaneous
welfare function will likely give rise to a time consistency problem for the
regulator. It would cause the social planner to change their price plan if
they could re-optimise in a future period. To see this, suppose that cur-
rently the regulator follows the plan prescribed by condition (3.24). If,
however, they were able to deviate from that plan, they would choose
their current price according to (3.23), rather than (3.24).
Mathematically, time inconsistency arises from the presence of the term
wt−13 in condition (3.24). This term captures the effect of a change in the
current period’s price on the previous period’s welfare. This effect will be
internalised by a regulator who can precommit to future prices. However,
if a subsequent regulator can re-optimise, he will disregard periods that,
from his viewpoint, have already passed. Consequently the re-optimised
price path will be revised downward, drawing too much demand away
from the preceding period.
Unless the social planner has access to a precommitment device that
enables him to enforce the plan defined by (3.23) and (3.24), he will not
be able to attain the first-best outcome because of his incentive to deviate
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from it in future periods. When choosing his pricing strategy, a sophisti-
cated social planner will recognise this problem and account for future in-
centives to deviate. The subgame perfect equilibrium of the intrapersonal
game between the current and regulators will deliver a time consistent
sequence of prices.
3.3.2 Second-best price path
A regulator who is sophisticated (in the sense of O’Donoghue and Ra-
bin (1999)) will take into account the behaviour of their future selves and
will choose the current price accordingly. That is why we now consider
a dynamic intrapersonal game, where the players are the various tem-
poral incarnations of the social planner. Essentially the current regula-
tor solves a constrained maximisation problem where future pricing poli-
cies are required to be sub-game perfect. Again, we focus on the Markov-
perfect equilibrium of the regulator’s intrapersonal game: the current pric-
ing strategy is assumed to depend only on the current state of the world:
pt = f(pt−1). Furthermore, we assume that the strategy function f(p) is
continuously differentiable, which eliminates the possibility of an infinite
number of equilibria. However, the above assumptions do not guarantee
existence or uniqueness of a Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Again, we need to specify how the regulator forms their expectations
about future prices. As before, we assume that the social planner has per-
fectly rational expectations. That is, he correctly predicts future prices on
and off the equilibrium path. This assumption prevents the existence of
a multiplicity of equilibria (Stokey, 1981). Given the focus on Markovian
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strategies it implies that pt+1 = f(pt).
The regulator’s MPE price path can be characterised with the help of
dynamic programming. The equilibrium pricing strategy solves the Bell-
man equation:
W (pt−1) = max
pt
{
w
(
pt−1, pt, fe(pt)
)
+ δW (pt)
}
∀ : t ≥ 1, (3.27)
where W (p) is the social planner’s value function. Since MPE strategies
are time invariant, we must also have
f(pt−1) = arg max
pt
{
w
(
pt−1, pt, fe(pt)
)
+ δW (pt)
}
. (3.28)
The recursive formulation of this problem ensures the regulator’s pricing
policy will be time consistent.
Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Then the method used
to derive the monopolist’s Euler equation can also yield the generalised
Euler-Lagrange equation of the welfare maximisation game:
wt2 + w
t
3f
t+1
1 + δw
t+1
1 = 0. (3.29)
This equation implicitly defines the second-best price trajectory that
would result from adhering to the time consistent policy function f(p).
The term wt3f
t+1
1 reflects the intrapersonal strategic effect, i.e. the effect
of current prices on current welfare via future pricing. When the period-
t + 1 price is determined, the regulator will not take into account the neg-
ative effect of this pricing decision on period-t welfare. Thus, from the
current viewpoint, future prices are expected to be suboptimally low. The
period-t regulator anticipates this behaviour and mitigates these effects by
choosing lower current prices. This implies that the time consistent prices
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described by equation (3.29) will be below the first-best precommitment
prices, thus generating lower welfare.
Using the definition of instantaneous welfare, equation (3.29) can be
rewritten as(
pit2 + f
t+1
1 pi
t
3 + δpi
t+1
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
laissez-faire Euler eqn
)
+
(
CSt2 + f
t+1
1 CS
t
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
effect of p on CS
)
− ( ψt2 + f t+11 ψt3 + δψt+11︸ ︷︷ ︸
effect of p on pollution
)
= 0 (3.30)
or, alternatively,[
pit2 + CS
t
2 − ψt2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+ f t+11
[
pit3 + CS
t
3 − ψt3
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect of pt
on present via f t+1
+ δ
[
pit+11 − ψt+11
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted, direct effect
of pt on the future
= 0.
(3.31)
Note that, if
CSt2 + f
t+1
1 CS
t
3 = ψ
t
2 + f
t+1
1 ψ
t
3 + δψ
t+1
1 , (3.32)
then the time consistent laissez-faire price path could replicate the regu-
lator’s second-best price path. That is to say, if the downward pressure
on the price from the reduction in market power is precisely offset by the
upward pressure from the pollution externality, the laissez-faire outcome
will be efficient. Of course, this coincidence is highly unlikely. It should
also be noted that, if the regulator is unable to precommit, social welfare
could possibly be higher in the absence of government intervention.
We conclude that the social planner’s optimal time-consistent price se-
quence is not first best. The dynamic consistency problem experienced by
the regulator prevents them from fully correcting the inefficiencies associ-
ated with the pollution emissions of a durable goods monopolist.
Chapter 4
Proposition
The previous section demonstrated that if there is a jump variable in firm
profits and if the regulator cannot precommit to future prices, he is unable
to follow the first-best price path. That is because the polluter’s time con-
sistency problem is transferred to the regulator. In order to maintain time
consistency of his policies, the regulator can only implement a second best
outcome. The first-best level of welfare is feasible only if the government
could credibly precommit to future actions.
The problem of gaining commitment power, where it is not obviously
available, has been explored in the literature on strategic delegation. In
this chapter we study how the idea of strategic delegation has been used
in the context of duopoly games to avail agents of precommitment power.
We then combine the concept of strategic delegation with Pigouvian tax-
ation to create a taxation mechanism that overcomes the regulator’s time
consistency problem.
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4.1 Strategic delegation
The strategic delegation literature claims that the separation of ownership
and management can be used as a means of gaining a strategic advan-
tage in imperfectly competitive markets. Oligopolists who compete in
a Cournot setting would each like to be in the position of a Stackelberg
leader. By delegating output decisions, they can use managerial contracts
to gain a first-mover advantage. If the owners can set the managerial wage
contracts before output decisions are made, they can provide their man-
agers with incentives for aggressive production. Thus, wage contracts can
have commitment power: delegation will provide firms with a first-mover
advantage.
The idea of strategic delegation began with the papers of Sklivas (1987)
and Fershtman and Judd (1987), in which they suggest that each duopolist
could increase their profits by delegating output decisions to a manager.
The manager’s behaviour is incentivised through a remuneration contract.
The papers show that the decision to delegate managerial control is indi-
vidually rational and a dominant strategy for each firm. This line of work
has been continued by many authors, including Miller and Pazgal (2001),
Basu (1993) and Baye et al. (1996).
In a different strand of research, Rogoff (1985) shows that a govern-
ment too can benefit from the precommitment power of delegation. He
studies a macroeconomic model of monetary policy. Agents’ rational ex-
pectations imply the presence of jump states in welfare, giving rise to a
time consistency problem for the government. Thus, in the absence of
precommitment, the government’s monetary policy decisions tend to ex-
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hibit inflationary bias. Rogoff argues that the appointment of a central
banker with a particular set of preferences would allow the government
to credibly commit to socially optimal inflation However, such one-shot
delegation would require the regulator to find a third party whose prefer-
ences are socially optimal. The difficulties this entails are obvious, so such
a solution cannot be considered a practical.
Similarly, we argue that ‘delegation’ could provide the government
with the necessary precommitment power to achieve the first-best out-
come when regulating a durable goods monopolist. We combine the ap-
proaches of Rogoff (1985) and Sklivas (1987). In our model, pricing deci-
sions are ’delegated’ to the monopolist, while the regulator uses pecuniary
incentives to influence future prices. The monopolist is induced to follow
the regulator’s preferred price path with the help of a taxation mechanism.
The purpose of the tax is to provide the producer with socially optimal
incentives. Our contribution is to show that taxes not only redress the in-
efficiencies arising from pollution and market power, but also serve as a
commitment device by decoupling the regulator’s decision from the pric-
ing decision.
4.2 Optimal taxation
Using a delegation tax game to overcome dynamic inconsistency has three
key advantages over Rogoff’s one-shot delegation approach:
Ease of implementation Taxation is a type of regulation that is already
performed by the government and so the institutions are already in
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place to implement this policy. The regulator only needs to adjust
the tax rule to ensure time-consistent implementation.
Dynamic robustness A regulator who has a time consistency problem
will have an incentive to intervene in the future if they are not in-
sulated from the pricing decision. We show that our proposal attains
the first-best outcome even when the government is able to alter the
taxation policy in future periods.
Insensitivity to managerial preferences In contrast to the approach taken
by Rogoff, our model does not require delegation to a party with a
particular set of preferences. Pricing decisions are made by the mo-
nopolist themselves and the taxation mechanism will provide them
with correct incentives regardless of their demand and cost structure.
4.2.1 A regulatory model
We now extend the model described in the previous chapter to include
a taxation mechanism and show how it overcomes the regulator’s time
inconsistency problem.
To maximise social welfare, the social planner must eliminate the in-
efficiencies generated by the pollution externality, the market power and
the dynamic inconsistency of the monopolist. The government can mo-
tivate him to follow the socially optimal price path by using Pigouvian
taxes that increase firm costs. Rather than directly choosing prices, the so-
cial planner now maximises welfare by choosing a tax policy. The timing
of the taxation game discussed below implies that the regulator cannot af-
fect the current choice. This enables him to resolve his time inconsistency
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problem.
Pigouvian taxes
In this model we consider a flow pollution externality ψ(xt). The Pigou-
vian tax could be levied on either output or pollution. We assume that the
government taxes emissions, but our results would be similar if output
was taxed instead. Thus, the monopolist’s period-t tax obligation can be
written as
Ωt = τ tψ(xt). (4.1)
Note that τ t might vary over time. In our model, this would happen if the
value of the state variable changes throughout the game.
The monopolist’s instantaneous profit, net of taxes, is given by
pit(pt−1, pt, pt+1, τ t) = ptxt − C(xt)− τ tψ(xt). (4.2)
Tax revenues
The tax revenue raised by the government is defined as the sum paid by
the monopolist. However, the regulator’s valuation of this revenue may
not be the same as its monetary value. To recognise that the government
and the monopolist may value tax revenues differently, we assume that the
welfare benefit from the tax revenues is ατ tψ(xt), α ∈ [0, 1]. If α = 0 tax
revenues have no social benefit, while α = 1 indicates that the government
and the monopolist value the revenue equally.
We do not hypothesise what might be done with the tax revenues since
they may not remain within the industry. However, in order to remain
revenue-neutral, they could be returned to the monopolist as a lump-sum
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transfer. Provided that the transfer is not dependent upon the monopo-
list’s actions, they would not have an impact on the price path chosen or
the efficiency of the market.
Costs to policy adjustment
In many real-world situations, government policy changes are not cost-
less. There could be costs to changing the tax regime in the consultation,
policy development and political manoeuvring that must be done. Ana-
lytically this implies that previous tax policies may affect current welfare.
Consequently, τ t−1 would be a payoff-relevant state variable in period t.
We assume that the larger the deviation from the status quo, the larger
the welfare cost. To model this consideration, we include the term
θ
(
τ t − τ t−1)2 (4.3)
in period-t instantaneous welfare. That is, the cost of changing the tax
rate increases proportionately to the square of the change.1 This specifica-
tion ensures that the adjustment cost is positive. Moreover, it reflects the
difficulty of enacting significant changes in regulations. The coefficient θ
allows us to capture the importance of these costs relative to consumer
surplus and profits.
1Any convex function would suffice but the use of a quadratic function simplifies the
derivations with little loss of generality since the functional form is not central to the
proposed mechanism.
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The regulator’s instantaneous payoff is thus
wt
(
pt−1, pt, pt+1, τ t−1, τ t
)
= pit
(
pt−1, pt, pt+1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gross profits
+CSt
(
pt−1, pt, pt+1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumer
surplus
− ψt(pt−1, pt, pt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pollution
externality
− (1− α)τ tψt(pt−1, pt, pt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net cost of
taxation
− θ(τ t − τ t−1)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of policy
adjustment
(4.4)
As already discussed, welfare maximization with respect to prices is likely
to create time inconsistency issues since period-t welfare would depend
on the jump variable pt+1. However, in the tax games analyzed below,
the regulator now chooses taxes, while leaving pricing decisions to the
durable goods monopolist.
4.2.2 Timing
Having established the implications of taxation for welfare and profits,
we now define the timing of the interactions between the two parties. We
consider a setting where the monopolist and the regulator make their de-
cisions simultaneously in each period. The assumption of simultaneity
describes a situation in which the monopolist is unaware of the regula-
tor’s current tax rate prior to setting the price. This describes the common
situation in which firms make decisions before the details of current tax
policies have been announced to the public. It is likely that there would
be some scope for discussion of risk and option value in this model. We
leave these issues for future research.
The timing assumption is crucially important for our results. The si-
multaneity of decisions causes the monopolist’s current price choice to be
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independent of current taxes. This removes the jump state from the regu-
lator’s objective and remedies his time inconsistency problem. If the mo-
nopolist knew the current period’s taxes, the regulator could influence the
current period’s price. The regulator’s current payoff would then depend
on his next period’s choice and thus his time inconsistency problem will
remain.
4.2.3 The equilibrium of the regulation game
In this section we formulate the above problem as a dynamic game and
then solve for the subgame-perfect equilibrium tax and pricing strategies.
We model regulation as a game between the various temporal incarnations
of the regulator and the monopolist. When the regulator sets the current
tax rate τ t, he takes in to account not only the consequences of his deci-
sion for the future behaviour of the monopolist, but also the effect on the
behaviour of his own future selves. Similarly, when the durable goods
monopolist chooses the current price pt, he takes into account the implica-
tions for current profits, future regulation, as well as the behaviour of his
future selves.
Again, we focus on the Markov perfect equilibrium of the taxation
game. This will enable us to compare our results to the benchmarks stud-
ied in the previous chapter. The period-t strategies of the regulator and the
monopolist are restricted to be functions of the two payoff-relevant state
variables:
1. the previous period’s price pt−1; and,
2. the previous period’s tax level τ t−1.
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Let the strategies of the regulator and the monopolist be τ t = f(pt−1, τ t−1)
and pt = g(pt−1, τ t−1), respectively. We assume that these functions are
continuously differentiable. This allows us to use dynamic programming
to characterise them and rules out a potential multiplicity of equilibria.
Also, we need to specify how players form their expectations about
future prices. Just as before, we assume that agents have perfect rational
expectations: they correctly anticipate future prices both on and off the
equilibrium path. Given our focus on Markov strategies, this assumption
implies that pt+1e = g(pt, τ t).
To solve for the equilibrium strategies, we formulate the problems of
the monopolist and the regulator recursively. The solution concept of
Markov perfect equilibrium requires that these strategies solve a pair of
Bellman equations. The regulator’s Bellman equation states that the equi-
librium tax rate must maximise the net present value of welfare:
W (pt−1, τ t−1)
= max
τ t
{
w
(
pt−1, g
(
pt−1, τ t−1
)
, g
(
g
(
pt−1, τ t−1
)
, τ t, τ t−1
)
, τ t
)
+ δW
(
g
(
pt−1, τ t−1
)
, τ t
)}
. (4.5)
The monopolist’s Bellman equation states the equilibrium pricing strategy
must maximise the discounted stream of profits:
Π
(
pt−1, τ t−1
)
= max
pt
{
pi
(
pt−1, pt, g
(
pt, f
(
pt−1, τ t−1
))
, f
(
pt−1, τ t−1
))
+ δΠ
(
pt, f
(
pt−1, τ t−1
))}
. (4.6)
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Moreover, time invariance of Markov-perfect strategies requires that
f(pt−1, τ t−1)
= arg max
τ t
{
w
(
pt−1, g
(
pt−1, τ t−1
)
, g
(
g
(
pt−1, τ t−1
)
, τ t, τ t−1
)
, τ t
)
+ δW
(
g
(
pt−1, τ t−1
)
, τ t
)}
, (4.7)
and
g(pt−1, τ t−1) = arg max
pt
{
pi
(
pt−1, pt, g
(
pt, f
(
pt−1, τ t−1
))
, f
(
pt−1, τ t−1
))
+ δΠ
(
pt, f
(
pt−1, τ t−1
))}
. (4.8)
The recursive formulation yields strategies that prescribe optimal ac-
tions for any values of the state variables. Thus, optimality is ensured for
any history of play. Consequently, the Markov-perfect equilibrium is also
subgame perfect, and therefore time consistent.
4.2.4 Resolving the regulator’s time inconsistency
An inspection of the regulator’s Bellman equation (4.5) reveals that its
right hand side no longer depends on the regulator’s future decision, τ t+1,
but only on his current strategy, τ t, and the current state, (pt−1, τ t−1). Thus,
delegation resolves the regulator’s time consistency problem by effectively
removing the jump variable from instantaneous welfare. The economic
interpretation is that the regulator’s period-(t + 1) decision no longer im-
poses an externality on period-t welfare.
In our setting, taxation serves as an intrapersonal commitment device:
the current regulator is unable to interfere in the choice of the current price.
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Note that the social planner is free to affect future prices. However, the
period t and t + 1 regulators do not disagree about the choice of pt+2 .
Thus, if the cost of delegation is low, they will provide the monopolist
with incentives to choose the first-best (i.e. precommitment) price path.2
The above observation is crucially dependent upon the assumption of
simultaneous choice of prices and taxes. If the monopolist knew the tax
rate before he set his price level, the current regulator would be able to
influence the monopolist’s current price choice. This would create a temp-
tation for the regulator to deviate from the plan preferred by his prede-
cessor. Analytically, there would still be a jump variable in instantaneous
welfare.
4.2.5 Equilibrium strategies
Bellman equations (4.5)–(4.8) yield a pair of Euler equations which charac-
terise the equilibrium strategies of the monopolist and the regulator. They
are provided in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are satisfied. The Markov
perfect equilibrium strategies solving the taxation game from period 2 onward sat-
isfy the necessary conditions defined by the following generalised Euler-Lagrange
equations:
Regulator’s condition
wt1 − gt1
[
δwt4 + w
t−1
5
δgt2
]
+
δwt−12 + w
t
3
δ2
+
δwt−14 + w
t−2
5
δ2gt−12
= 0 ∀ t ≥ 0
(4.9)
2If θ = 0 then τ t−1 is not an element of the payoff function and the resulting equilib-
rium, while time consistent, will no longer be Markov-perfect.
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Monopolist’s condition
pit3g
t+1
2 + pi
t
4 +
pit−12 + pi
t−1
3 g
t
1 + δpi
t
1
δf t1
= δf t+12
[
pit+13 g
t+2
2 +
pit2 + pi
t
3g
t+1
1 + δpi
t+1
1
δf t+11
]
∀ t ≥ 0. (4.10)
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
4.3 Comparison with benchmarks
If we substitute the derivatives of (4.4), we can rewrite the regulator’s Eu-
ler equation as
pit−13 + CS
t−1
3 − ψt−13 + (α− 1)τ t−1ψt−13
+
1
gt2
[
(α− 1)ψt−1 + 2θ
(
δ
(
τ t − τ t−1)− (τ t−1 − τ t−2))]
+δ
(
pit2−ψt2 +CSt2 +(α−1)τ tψt2
)
+δ2
(
pit+11 −ψt+11 +CSt+11 +(α−1)τ t+1ψt+11
)
− δg
t+1
1
gt+12
[
(α− 1)ψt − 2θ(τ t − τ t−1)+ 2δθ(τ t+1 − τ t)] = 0. (4.11)
When θ = 0 and α = 1, this equation replicates the precommitment Euler
equation, (3.24). The implication is that if policy adjustment costs are zero
and the government’s valuation of the tax revenue is equal to the firm’s
valuation of the cost of taxation, then the regulator will choose the tax rate
in such a way as to induce the monopolist to follow the first-best price
path.
Our taxation mechanism provides the regulator with commitment op-
portunities for one period at a time. It enables him to overcome his time
inconsistency. As long as his incentives are not distorted by other consid-
erations, he can achieve the first best outcome. In chapter 5 we explore
CHAPTER 4. PROPOSITION 46
the extent to which the price is distorted by revenue valuation and costs
of changing policy.
Chapter 5
Computation
The previous chapter analytically demonstrated that the outcome of the
regulation game replicates the first-best price path, which is likely to be
different from the second best and laissez-faire outcomes. However, it
was not possible to explore comparative statics, since characterization was
provided with difference-differential Euler equations. In this chapter we
develop a numerical example of the regulation game to investigate the
impact of parameter changes on the outcome of the game.
First, our model is given specific functional form and solved for strate-
gies and a steady state. We then vary the parameter values in order to
assess the effect upon both the transition path and the resulting steady
state.
In the interests of brevity, a numerical solution for the first-best and
second-best paths is not provided. The previous chapter has already char-
acterised those analytically, so a numerical simulation can add little in-
sight.
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5.1 Defining the model
To solve our model numerically, we need to specify functional forms for
agents’ payoffs.
5.1.1 The demand function
For simplicity, consumers’ tastes are assumed to be uniformly distributed
across the support: φ(v) = 1. This implies that Φ(v) = v and demand is
therefore
xt = pt−1 − (β + 1)pt + βpt+1. (5.1)
5.1.2 The welfare function
To construct welfare, the cost function and the pollution function must be
defined. The monopolist’s cost function is assumed to be quadratic:
C
(
xt
)
=
ρ
2
(
xt
)2
. (5.2)
This specification guarantees that assumption 2 is satisfied. Furthermore,
we assume that the pollution function is linear:
ψ
(
xt
)
= κxt. (5.3)
Substituting (5.1) into the consumer surplus defined in equation (3.12)
yields
CSt =
1
2
(
1− (βpt+1)2 + (pt)2)+ β(pt)2 − ptpt−1. (5.4)
Combining equations (5.1), (5.2) and (3.10) delivers the monopolist’s
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instantaneous profit
pit = −1
2
(
(β + 1)pt − βpt+1 − pt−1)[(
2 + (β + 1)ρ
)
pt − ρ(pt−1 + βpt+1)]. (5.5)
Finally, combining the above equations into the form of (3.14) gives us
welfare. For brevity, that function is not reproduced here.
The initial parameter values used in the system of equations are shown
in Table 5.1. They give us a base case scenario, which is a starting point of
our analysis.
Description Symbol Value
Government revenue valuation α 1
Cost of policy adjustment θ 0.5
Production cost coefficient ρ 1
Pollution cost coefficient κ 3
Consumer discount factor β 0.5
Bellman discount rate δ 0.8
Table 5.1: Base case parameter values
5.2 Solving the model
Having specified the problem, we now solve it numerically. Since this
problem is linear in its state dynamics and quadratic in the players’ pay-
offs, it will generate a Markov-perfect equilibrium in linear strategies. Hence,
we conjecture that the strategy functions which solve the players’ Euler
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equations have forms
f(pt−1, τ t−1) = αr + γr1pt−1 + γr2τ t−1, (5.6)
g(pt−1, τ t−1) = αm + γm1pt−1 + γm2τ t−1. (5.7)
The subscriptsm and r denote the coefficients on the the monopolist’s and
regulator’s strategy parameters.
Substituting the derivatives of welfare and the strategy conjectures into
the generalised Euler equations gives us a system of equations that can be
solved numerically. We determine the strategy parameters in equations
(5.6) using the method of undetermined coefficients For brevity the solu-
tion procedure is not presented here. The numerical results of the simula-
tions can be found in Appendix C.
5.3 Base case
This section presents the results of our simulations. We first explain the
intuition behind the numerical example. Then we examine the effect of
varying some of the key parameters listed in Table 5.1. The equivalence of
the regulatory game and the first best is not explicitly discussed here be-
cause this result has been demonstrated generally in the previous chapter.
In order to compare outcomes across various parameter values, two
approaches are utilised. First, a comparison of convergence paths is made
for variation in time preference parameters, δ and β. Secondly, a compari-
son of steady states is made across all parameter values.
However, before turning to comparative statics, we outline the results
from the base line scenario and discuss some of the less intuitive elements
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of the simulation.
Prices and demand
Let us first examine the trajectories of prices and demand. They are shown
in Figures 5.1a and 5.1c overleaf.
The price is falling over time as the market participants with the great-
est valuation of the good purchase and exit the market. Therefore, condi-
tion (3.1) is satisfied. The price gradually converges towards a steady state
of p¯ ≈ 1.2 (see Appendix C for a precise value). It should be noted that the
steady state is an asymptote of the price trajectory and is not reached in
finite time.
Demand declines over time as the price differences across periods di-
minish. If the price were to reach the steady state level, demand would
drop to zero. But since the steady state is approached only asymptotically,
demand is positive in all periods. As demand declines, so does the level
of pollution generated by production (Figure 5.1e).
Notably, firm profits are negative in this example. This raises the ques-
tion of why would this firm want to stay in business. Remember that
the profits reported in Figure 5.1d are after-tax. Pre-tax profits happen
to be positive in all periods. As the monopolist cares about net profits,
the regulator could return the tax revenues to the monopolist as a lump-
sum transfer to keep him in business. Indeed, the point of taxation in this
model is to induce optimal behaviour, not to redistribute wealth. Thus,
there is nothing inherently objectionable about returning the revenues to
the monopolist. So long as the government’s transfers to the monopolist
are not conditional on the current state variables, the efficiency of the mo-
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Figure 5.1: Convergence in the base case over 12 periods
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nopolist’s decisions will not be affected.
Given our initial conditions, the equilibrium tax rate is also declining
over time as pollution levels are reduced. In the steady state the level of
taxation is about a third of the sale price (τ¯ ≈ 0.4). The declining pollution
externality reduces the need for taxation to alleviate the problem. In ad-
dition, the monopolist’s time inconsistency causes them to charge a lower
price in the current period in order to offset their incentive for a price re-
duction in the following period. As prices in consecutive periods converge
over time, that incentive is reduced. Consequently, the level of taxation re-
quired to correct for the monopolist’s inconsistency also declines.
The final variable charted in Figure 5.1 is instantaneous welfare. It is
initially negative but converges to a positive value as the pollution level
drops. The positive value of the welfare is driven by consumer surplus.1
So far, the convergence paths of each variable in the base case accord
with what might be expected. Having canvassed them, we now turn to
variations of the parameters in Table 5.1 and the effect that such variations
have on the convergence paths and steady state levels of p¯ and τ¯ .
5.4 Varying parameters
Variation of the parameters is conducted in two parts. First, variations
that affect the convergence paths are considered. The simulation results
1Readers may be concerned about the negative values of profit and welfare in the
early periods. Note first that steady-state welfare and profits are non-negative. Then the
values for each off the equilibrium path are entirely determined by the initial conditions.
An arbitrarily different choice of initial conditions could generate everywhere-positive
profits and/or welfare.
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demonstrate that the parameters with the greatest impact upon conver-
gence paths are the time preference parameters, δ and β. The remaining
parameters have a negligible effect upon convergence rates: it would not
be visible at the scale plotted above in Figure 5.1. Consequently, conver-
gence plots are given only for those two variables.
The implications of the remaining variables for the equilibrium out-
come are analysed solely through their effect on the steady state levels p¯
and τ¯ .
5.4.1 Convergence across parameter values
In this subsection, the effect of varying the time preference parameters on
convergence rates is investigated.
Varying β
The first parameter that we vary is β, the consumer discount rate. It em-
bodies both the rate of consumer time preference and the depreciation rate
of the durable good. Consequently, it is rather lower than one might ex-
pect for an ordinary time preference rate. In the base case, we set it to
β = 0.5. For the variation we consider a range of values between 0.49
and 0.52. Beyond that range the steady state of the system is not in the
neighbourhood of the base case.
The results are shown in Figure 5.2 where β = 0.49. The lower end of
the range is denoted by the pale blue line and β = 0.52, at the upper end,
is in red. The first thing to notice is that the trajectory of demand is steeper
when β is lower. A lower value of β decreases the value of postponing
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Figure 5.2: Convergence for β ∈ {0.49, 0.5, 0.51, 0.52}
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consumption, as the perceived value of the durable good in the next pe-
riod is lower. Consequently, socially optimal consumption is shifted to
earlier periods and demand is initially higher but falls more quickly since
there is a constant mass of consumers. The increase in demand in early pe-
riods also pushes up pollution levels and results in higher total pollution
flows, which also cost the monopolist profits due to the higher taxation.
Interestingly, despite the higher pollution levels the regulator chooses not
to change the tax rate significantly across the range of β’s tested.
Varying δ
The final part of our examination of convergence is an investigation of
variations of the discount factor of the government and the monopolist,
δ. It describes how future payoffs are valued relative to the current pe-
riod’s payoff in the taxation game. The results are shown in Figure 5.3 and
are very similar to the results for variation in β, as one might expect for
another time preference parameter.
The only notable differences are in the magnitude of the effect and the
impact upon the tax rate. The magnitude of the effect is slightly greater
since β influences all future values, rather then solely consumers’ valua-
tions of the durable good. However, it is the path of the tax rate that is
more interesting.
In Figure 5.2b the tax rate varied little between different values of β
whereas, in Figure 5.3b, the tax rate shows similar variation to the price
path.
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Figure 5.3: Convergence for δ ∈ {0.78, 0.79, 0.8, 0.81, 0.82}
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5.4.2 Steady states across parameter values
Having examined the impact on convergence of time preference rates we
now turn to the steady state comparison. In this subsection we focus on
the difference in steady states as the parameters vary. Figure 5.4 shows a
scatter plot of p¯ and τ¯ for pairs of parameter values. The pairs are chosen
by the magnitude of their effect so the scale of the plot shrinks from Figure
5.4a through to Figure 5.4c.
A indicated in the previous section, the time preference rates have the
greatest impact on the result and in a similar fashion; δ with greater magni-
tude than β. That is clearly shown by Figure 5.4a, which indicates that the
effect of each on the steady state is identical in direction and varies only
in magnitude. As agents reduce their valuation of future payoffs the mo-
nopolist is forced to lift their production and reduce their price in order to
maintain demand for their product. That, in turn generates pollution and
causes a commensurate lift in the tax rate to compensate.
In Figure 5.4b the government’s valuation of tax revenues, α, and the
pollution function’s coefficient, κ, are varied. The effect of a drop in α is
to increase the tax rate levied by the regulator while changing the rate of
pollution has no effect upon the tax rate but does affect the price charged
by the monopolist.
Finally, Figure 5.4c shows the negligible impact that the cost of policy
changes, θ, and the production cost coefficient, ρ, have on the steady state.
Increasing ρ causes the monopolist to increase prices, as might be expected
when their marginal costs rise; however, the scale of the impact is such
that it is an insignificant effect relative to that of time preference and the
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coefficient on pollution.
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Chapter 6
Extension: a quasi-hyperbolic
discounting model
In Chapter 2.2 we mentioned that there are two main causes of dynamic
inconsistency: jump states and hyperbolic discounting. The prior chapters
of this thesis have dealt extensively with the issue of regulation in the pres-
ence of jump states. We developed a variant of a strategic delegation game
to deal with inconsistency implied by a jump state. Inefficiencies due to
hyperbolic discounting can be addressed in a similar way. In this chapter
we demonstrate how the same mechanism can also be used by a regulator
who suffers from inconsistency due to quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
We will argue that this type of inconsistency is different from the prob-
lem posed by jump states. However, the taxation mechanism described in
chapter 4 can still attain the socially optimal outcome.
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6.1 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting
Hyperbolic discounting models originated from Ainslie (1992)’s empiri-
cal work. He showed that a hyperbolic curve is a far better match for the
discount rate of most people than the standard exponential curve. When
agents use hyperbolic discounting, their intertemporal trade-offs are not
time invariant. Thus, such discount functions are not as mathematically
easy to work with as exponential functions. Because of this difficulty
Ainslie’s book did not get the attention it deserved until the modifications
by Laibson (1997) which made the analysis more tractable.
Rather than adopting a full hyperbolic function, Laibson introduced an
exponential function with a modifier on the current period’s discount rate.
In Laibson’s model, the discount factor for the next period is βδ, where 0 <
β < 1 and 0 < δ < 1. All subsequent periods are discounted exponentially
by a factor δ. This modification makes the model both simple to work with
and a fair approximation of a hyperbolic function. Time preferences with
this structure are known as quasi-hyperbolic preferences.
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting captures non-stationary time preferences,
a` la hyperbolic discounting, while preserving analytical tractability. Non-
stationarity gives rise to time inconsistency, as the intertemporal trade-off
between two successive periods will change with the agent’s time refer-
ence. Consequently, precommitment has value similar to that in models
with jump states.
In the following two chapters we develop a simple quasi-hyperbolic
discounting model analogous to the monopolistic model of Chapter 3.
Then we demonstrate the ability of the taxation game to correct both the
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regulator’s time inconsistency as well as the pollution externality.
6.2 The quasi-hyperbolic model
As before, this model also involves a monopolist producing a good that
creates a pollution externality. The regulator addresses inefficiencies caused
by this externality through Pigouvian taxation. However, the regulator
suffers from self-control problems induced by quasi-hyperbolic time pref-
erences.
6.3 Elements of the model
The description of our model begins with a characterisation of the agents:
a consumer, a monopolist and a regulator.
6.3.1 The consumer
Imagine a representative consumer who derives utility from two goods:
a polluting good, x, and a numeraire, m. The consumer’s instantaneous
utility function is
U(x,m) = u(x) +m. (6.1)
We assume that u(x) satisfies the Inada conditions. This ensures that the
inverse demand is well-defined for all positive values of x.
The consumer’s budget constraint is
px+m = I. (6.2)
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Therefore, inverse demand in this market is given by
p = u′(x). (6.3)
6.3.2 The monopolist
The market for good x is served by a monopolist with a cost function C(x)
. His instantaneous profit function is
pi(x) = R(x)− C(x) (6.4)
= px− C(x). (6.5)
Equation (6.3) implies that profit can also be written as
pi(x) = u′(x)x− C(x). (6.6)
The monopolist has standard exponential time preferences and is thus
time consistent.
6.3.3 The regulator
Production generates a pollution externality that is not internalised by the
monopolist. Unlike in the previous chapters, here pollution is modelled
as a stock externality rather than a flow externality. The regulator has
oversight of the monopolist and seeks to mitigate the damage wrought
by the monopolist’s emissions. The stock of pollution generated by the
production of good x at time t is denoted by kt.1 The environmental harm
caused by this stock is ϕ(kt), where ϕ′(kt) > 0.
1For tractability in this model we have switched from flow pollution to stock pollu-
tion.
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The stock of pollution evolves according to the following law-of-motion:
kt = θk
t−1 + xt−1. (6.7)
The parameter θ ∈ [0, 1) represents the rate of pollution carry-over. Instan-
taneous welfare is thus given by
w(xt, kt) = pi(xt) + CS(xt)− ϕ(kt) (6.8)
= u′(xt)xt − C(xt) +
∫ xt
0
u′(x) dx− u′(xt)xt − ϕ(kt) (6.9)
= u(xt)− C(xt)− ϕ(kt). (6.10)
The regulator suffers from time inconsistency and is modelled as hav-
ing quasi-hyperbolic preferences. In particular, his net present valuation
of welfare from the period-t perspective is
Wt = w(xt, kt) + β
∞∑
i=1
δiw(xt+i, kt+i). (6.11)
Note the β modifier in lifetime welfare. If β = 1 then the preferences
are ‘exponential’ and time consistent. If β < 1, as is assumed here, then
preferences are ‘present biased’ (i.e. non-stationary) and the regulator will
experience dynamic inconsistency.
6.4 Laissez-faire equilibrium
First we consider the laissez-faire case. Suppose that the firm is not regu-
lated by the government. The monopolist does not account for the dam-
ages arising from his pollution. As a result, the pollution stock does not
appear in his payoff. In each period, the firm solves the following static
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problem:
max
x
u′(x)x− C(x). (6.12)
The first order condition of this problem is
u′′(x`)x` + u′
(
x`
)− C ′ (x`) = 0, (6.13)
where x` denotes the laissez-faire level of output chosen by the monopo-
list. Intuitively, condition (6.13) delivers the output level at which marginal
profit is equal to zero.
Since the monopolist discounts future payoffs exponentially, his life-
time profit is
∞∑
t=0
δtpit =
u′
(
x`
)
x` − C (x`)
1− δ . (6.14)
6.5 Benchmarking regulation
6.5.1 First best regulation
Before we analyse the taxation game, let us first benchmark the perfor-
mance of a regulator who could choose output levels. Again, we first
examine the problem of a hypothetical regulator who can both directly
determine output and perfectly precommit to future policies.
Suppose that the regulator can directly choose the lifetime output plan
{xt}∞t=0 at time 0. The optimal plan would solve
W0 = u(x0)− C(x0)− ϕ(k0) + β
∞∑
t=1
δt [u(xt)− C(xt)− ϕ(kt)] (6.15)
where the state variable evolves according to
kt = θkt−1 + xt−1,
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δ is the discount rate and β is the quasi-hyperbolic modifier on the future
discount factor.
The regulator’s optimal choice will satisfy
w01 + βδ
(
w12 − θw11
)
= 0 (6.16)
in period 0, and
wt1 + δ
(
wt2 − θwt+11
)
= 0 ∀ t ≥ 2. (6.17)
for each subsequent period t. See Appendix D.1 for more detail.
Equations (6.16) and (6.17) together characterise the output path the
regulator would choose, were he able to directly control output levels.
From the perspective of the regulator at time 0, this is the first best out-
put path. After substituting w(xt, kt) from (6.8), we obtain
u′(xt)−C ′(xt)− δθ (u′(xt+1)− C ′(xt+1))− δϕ′(kt+1) = 0 ∀ t ≥ 2. (6.18)
This equation will be used for comparison with the laissez-faire condition,
as they have similar forms.
6.5.2 Comparison to laissez-faire outcome
It is instructive to compare the first-best outcome to the laissez-faire equi-
librium characterised in equation (6.13):
u′
(
x`
)− C ′ (x`)+ u′′ (x`)x` = 0. (6.19)
Remember that this condition sets the monopolist’s marginal profit to zero.
Since profit is concave, marginal profit is a decreasing function.
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We focus on the steady state of the model. Suppose that xt = x¯, ∀t, and
thus kt = k¯,∀t. Now rearrange equation (6.18),
u′ (x¯)− C ′ (x¯) = δϕ
′ (k¯)
1− δθ , (6.20)
and add u′′ (x¯) x¯ to both sides:
u′ (x¯)− C ′ (x¯) + u′′ (x¯) x¯ = δϕ
′ (k¯)
1− δθ + u
′′ (x¯) x¯. (6.21)
The left-hand side of the above equation represents the monopolist’s marginal
profit evaluated at the steady-state first best output level. Remember that
marginal profit is a decreasing function. Thus, if
δϕ′(k¯)
1−δθ + u
′′ (x¯) x¯ > 0 then
x¯ < x` and vice versa.
Signing the component parts gives
δϕ′ (x¯) > 0 (6.22)
1− βδ > 0 (6.23)
u′′ (x¯) x¯ < 0 (6.24)
So if
δϕ′
(
k¯
)
1− δθ > u
′′ (x¯) x¯ (6.25)
then x¯ < x`. The left hand side of the inequality represents the lifetime
marginal cost of the externality, while the right hand side is the dead-
weight loss due to monopoly power. The externality implies that the
quantity produced may be too high from a welfare point of view, while
the firm’s market power suggests that production could be too low. Tax-
ing the firm to reduce pollution is only worthwhile when the former effect
outweighs the latter. Henceforth, we shall assume that equation (6.25)
holds.
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6.5.3 Second best regulation
Sophisticated regulators would recognise that they have a time inconsis-
tency problem. Therefore, they will try to avail themselves of a solution.
If they unable to precommit to future policies, they will act strategically
to influence the decisions of their future selves. Such behaviour would
give rise to a time-consistent second best-output path. This path would
occur if the regulator could directly choose output, but had no means of
precommitting themselves to future decisions.
To solve for the time consistent equilibrium, we must formulate the
problem recursively. Let the MPE strategy of the regulator be xt = f(kt).
Then his Bellman equation is
U(kt) = max
xt
{w(xt, kt) + βδV (θkt + xt)} (6.26)
where U(·) is his current period’s value function and V (·) is his continua-
tion value function. The continuation value function captures the stream
of future payoffs from period t + 1 onward. It is different from the cur-
rent period’s value function because quasi-hyperbolic preferences are non-
stationary. Since from next period onwards the regulator would discount
welfare exponentially, the continuation value function must satisfy the re-
cursive equation
V (kt) = w (f(kt), kt) + δV (θkt + f(kt)) . (6.27)
Dynamic programming renders a generalised Euler equation that char-
acterises the regulator’s output strategy:
wt1 + βδ(w
t+1
1 f
t+1
1 + w
t+1
2 )− δ(θ + f t+11 )wt+11 = 0. (6.28)
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Note the difference between equation (6.28) and equation (6.17) . This
difference suggests that the time consistent path will not coincide with the
first-best (i.e. precommitment) path.
6.6 Regulation with delegation
Intuitively it should be possible to solve a quasi-hyperbolic discounting
problem through ‘delegation’ of the pricing decision.
Quasi-hyperbolic time preferences give rise to time inconsistent be-
haviour. However, the internal strategic conflict between two successive
regulators, in periods t and t + 1, only concerns the choice of the period-
t + 1 action. These two regulators do not disagree about future actions,
as both will discount future payoffs exponentially. Thus, by eliminating
the direct effect of today’s decision on next period’s payoff, it should be
possible to render the regulator consistent.
In our delegation game, the regulator sets a tax rate for pollution si-
multaneously with the monopolist’s choice of output. Both the tax and
the output are feedback strategies. As in the previous chapters, we con-
sider a linear tax on emissions.
6.6.1 The welfare function
Taxation affects the regulator’s problem in two ways: first, he gains rev-
enue from taxation and, secondly, there is a cost to changing the tax rate
over time. Economists are often criticised that they do not account for
the cost of taxes when they recommend them. That is why we explicitly
CHAPTER 6. HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING 71
include the costs of implementing and modifying tax schemes in the reg-
ulator’s welfare function.
Suppose that the tax is levied on emissions and the revenue from the
tax is given to consumers as a lump sum transfer. Since the marginal util-
ity of income to consumers is 1, the value of the revenue in the welfare
function is equal to the cost of taxation borne by monopolist. Hence, the
tax is a simple transfer of surplus and does not change total welfare.
Period-t tax revenue is τtxt, where τt is the tax rate chosen by the gov-
ernment. Let the adjustment cost of changing policies be κρ(τt, τt−1).2 Then
instantaneous welfare is given by
w(xt, kt, τt, τt−1) = u(xt)− C(xt)− ϕ(kt)− κρ(τt, τt−1). (6.29)
Welfare is not directly affected by tax revenue, but changing the tax rate
over time is costly for the regulator. This assumption introduces a ‘sticki-
ness’ to the tax rate. Note that if κ = 0, policy adjustment will be costless
and the welfare function will not depend directly on the tax rate.
6.6.2 The profit function
Taxation implies that the monopolist’s instantaneous profit will now have
the following form:
pit = u
′(xt)xt − C(xt)− τtxt. (6.30)
2A plausible, specific functional form might be (τt − τt−1)2, as in Chapter 4.2.1.
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6.6.3 The taxation game
Next we set up a regulation game for this problem that mirrors the game
discussed in Chapter 4.
State variables and strategies
The state variables in this game are the previous period’s tax rate, τt−1, and
the stock of pollution, kt. Note that the current period’s tax rate is not a
state variable, as it is set in the current period.
In each period, the monopolist chooses output simultaneously with
the regulator’s choice of the current tax rate. Let the MPE strategy of the
monopolist be xt = h(τt−1, kt) and the MPE strategy of the regulator be
τt = g(τt−1, kt).
The regulator’s problem
The regulator Bellman equation is now given by
U(τt−1, kt) = max
τt
{
w
(
h(τt−1, kt), kt, τt, τt−1
)
+ βδV
(
τt, θkt + h(τt−1, kt)
)}
. (6.31)
The continuation value function V solves the functional equation
V (τt−1, kt) = w
(
h(τt−1, kt), kt, g(τt−1, kt), τt−1
)
+ δV
(
g(τt−1, kt), θkt + h(τt−1, kt)
)
. (6.32)
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The monopolist’s problem
Since the monopolist discounts exponentially there is no β in his Bellman
equation and it is standard:
Π(τt−1, kt) = max
xt
{pi(xt, g (τt−1, kt)) + δΠ (g(τt−1, kt), θkt + xt)} . (6.33)
Equilibrium strategies
From Bellman equations (6.31)– (6.33) we obtain the generalised Euler-
Lagrange equations characterising the optimal strategies for each player.
Using dynamic programming techniques, we can derive the monopo-
list’s Euler-Lagrange equation. It is given by
pit2g
t
1 +
gt1
gt2
(
θpit1 − pit2gt2 −
1
δ
pit−11
)
− θpi
t−1
1 − pit−12 gt−12 − 1δpit−21
δgt−12
= 0. (6.34)
See Appendix D.3.2 for the details.
The Euler-Lagrange equation characterising the regulator’s strategy is
wt−13 g
t−1
1 − β
(
wt−11 h
t−1
1 + w
t−1
3 g
t−1
1 + w
t−1
4
)
δht−11
− w
t−2
3
δ2ht−11
= β(wt1h
t
2 + w
t
2 + w
t
3g
t
2)− gt2wt3
+
(θ + ht2)
ht1
[
wt3g
t
1 − β
(
wt1h
t
1 + w
t
3g
t
1 + w
t
4
)− wt−13
δ
]
. (6.35)
The derivations are detailed in Appendix D.3.1.
To compare this game to the first-best outcome, let us consider the spe-
cial case where κ = 0, so policy change is costless. We substitute in the
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following partial derivatives of the welfare function:
wt1 = u
′(xt)− c′(xt) (6.36)
wt2 = −ϕ′(xt) (6.37)
wt3 = 0 (6.38)
wt4 = 0. (6.39)
After this substitution, Euler equation (6.35) reduces to
u′(xt−1)− c′(xt−1)
δ
− ϕ′(xt)− θ
(
u′(xt)− c′(xt)
)
= 0. (6.40)
Multiplying by δ and shifting the equation forward one period yields
u′(xt)− c′(xt)− δϕ′(xt+1)− δθ
(
u′(xt+1)− c′(xt+1)
)
= 0. (6.41)
Note that this replicates Euler equation (6.18) that characterizes the pre-
commitment outcome. Therefore, the regulation game will deliver the
first-best output path.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Time consistency is an important issue for regulators and can have serious
implications for policy effectiveness. This thesis demonstrates that mech-
anism design can alleviate this problem. We construct a game that allows
the regulator to attain the first best in a setting with externalities despite
his time inconsistency.
We take a case study of a polluting monopolist and demonstrate that
the regulator’s time inconsistency can adversely affect welfare. The regu-
lator’s inability to precommit may prevent him from fully eliminating the
inefficiency of the pollution externality. The main contribution is to show
that careful policy design may provide the regulator with precommitment
opportunities. The particular mechanism considered here is a modified
version of a Pigouvian tax. Obviously, such an instrument is not appropri-
ate for every situation. The general implication is that careful mechanism
design could enable regulators to achieve first-best outcomes, even in the
face of obstacles such as dynamic inconsistency.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that this thesis abstracts from many
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concerns facing regulators. We assume perfect information, discrete time,
a single market, a single firm serving that market and limited heterogene-
ity among consumers. Further research in the field would do well to relax
some of those assumptions and investigate the impact for regulators’ abil-
ity to achieve first-best outcomes.
Appendix A
Concavity of the monopolist’s
profit function
For concavity of the profit function we require ∂
2pi
∂(pt)2
< 0. Now, by differ-
entiating equation (3.10) twice
∂2pi
∂(pt)2
= 2
∂x
∂pt
− ∂x
∂pt
C ′′(x) +
∂2x
∂(pt)2
(
p− C ′(x)) < 0 (A.1)
The term 2 ∂x
∂pt
is negative because of the downward slope of the demand
function and − ∂x
∂pt
C ′′(x) must also be negative since by Assumption 2 the
cost function is convex. Now a monopoly will always set P > MC so
p−C ′(x) must be positive. Hence, it is sufficient for concavity of the profit
function that the demand function be weakly concave: ∂
2x
∂(pt)2
≤ 0.
Note that while this condition is sufficient it is not necessary since if the
cost function were highly convex then a mildly convex demand function
could still give a concave profit function.
Taking the second derivative of the demand function (equation (3.9))
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gives
∂2x
∂(pt)2
= β2Φ′′(pt−1 − βpt)− Φ′′(pt − βpt+1) < 0. (A.2)
Hence, the condition for concavity of the demand function is
β2Φ′′(pt−1 − βpt) < Φ′′(pt − βpt+1). (A.3)
Now, by equation (3.7), pt−1 − βpt > pt − βpt+1 so (A.3) can only hold for
all possible price trajectories if Φ′′′ ≤ 0. However, if Φ′′ < 0 then condition
(A.3) still cannot be guaranteed to hold. It is sufficient to further assume
that Φ′′ ≥ 0. Again, this is a sufficient rather than a necessary condition for
concavity of the profit function.
Appendix B
Equilibria of the durable goods
model
B.1 Time-consistency without precommitment
To solve the game described in 3.3.2 by maximising the Bellman function
(3.27) with respect to pt first differentiate it with respect to that variable to
give the first-order condition
∂V t
∂pt
= wt2 + w
t
3f
t+1
1 + δV
t+1
1 = 0 (B.1)
which rearranges to give
V t+11 = −
wt2 + w
t
3f
t+1
1
δ
. (B.2)
Now, to find the envelope condition that holds for the optimal strategy,
differentiate V t with respect to the state variable pt−1:
V t1 = w
t
1 + f
t
1
(
wt2 + w
t
3f
t+1
1 + δV
t+1
1
)
(B.3)
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Since, at the optimal point, the first order condition from (B.1) holds, we
know that wt2 + wt3f
t+1
1 + δV
t+1
1 = 0 and the envelope condition is thus
V t1 = w
t
1 (B.4)
Now substituting the derivative of the Bellman value function from (B.4)
into equation (B.2) gives equation (3.29).
B.2 MPE of the taxation game
This section demonstrates the solution to the game described in Section
4.2.
The regulator’s necessary condition
The first order condition for the regulator is derived by differentiating the
regulator’s Bellman equation with respect to τ t and setting it equal to zero.
∂W t
∂τ t
= wt3g
t+1
2 + δW
t+1
2 = 0 (B.5)
Thus the Bellman value function for the regulator is characterised by
W t+12 = −
wt3g
t+1
2
δ
. (B.6)
To solve for the generalised Euler-Lagrange equations which characterise
the equilibrium strategies of the regulator and the monopolist it is neces-
sary to find the envelope conditions in addition to the first-order condi-
tion. These are found by differentiating the Bellman value function with
respect to the states:
W t1 = w
t
1 + g
t
1
(
wt2 + w
t
3g
t+1
1 + δW
t+1
1
)
+ f t1
(
wt3g
t+1
2 + δW
t+1
2
)
(B.7)
W t2 = g
t
2
(
wt2 + w
t
3g
t+1
1 + δW
t+1
1
)
+ f t2
(
wt3g
t+1
2 + δW
t+1
2
)
(B.8)
APPENDIX B. DURABLE EQUILIBRIA 81
Since we know from the first order condition, (B.5), thatwt3g
t+1
2 +δW
t+1
2 = 0
in optimality it follows that the envelope conditions for the regulator’s
optimal strategy are
W t1 = w
t
1 + g
t
1
(
wt2 + w
t
3g
t+1
1 + δW
t+1
1
)
(B.9)
W t2 = g
t
2
(
wt2 + w
t
3g
t+1
1 + δW
t+1
1
)
. (B.10)
From these conditions and the first order conditions it is possible to solve
for the Euler-Lagrange equations by eliminating the unknown Bellman
value functions. First substituting (B.6) into (B.10) gives
−w
t−1
3 g
t
2
δ
= gt2
(
wt2 + w
t
3g
t+1
1 + δW
t+1
1
)
(B.11)
which simplifies to
W t+11 = −
wt−13 + δ
(
wt2 + w
t
3g
t+1
1
)
δ2
(B.12)
Now substituting (B.12) into (B.9) to eliminate the unknown Bellman value
function derivative gives
− w
t−2
3 + δ
(
wt−12 + w
t−1
3 g
t
1
)
δ2
= wt1
+ gt1
(
wt2 + w
t
3g
t+1
1 + δ
(
−w
t−1
3 + δ
(
wt2 + w
t
3g
t+1
1
)
δ2
))
(B.13)
which, shifted forward two period, simplifies to give equation (4.9).
The monopolist’s necessary condition
The first order condition for the monopolist is derived by differentiating
the monopolist’s Bellman equation with respect to pt and setting it equal
to zero.
∂Πt
∂pt
= pit2 + pi
t
3g
t
1 + δΠ
t+1
1 = 0 (B.14)
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The Bellman value function for the monopolist can then be characterised
by the equation
Πt+11 = −
pit2 + pi
t
3g
t
1
δ
(B.15)
Now finding the envelope conditions for the monopolist as was done for
the regulator:
Πt1 = pi
t
1 + g
t
1
(
pit2 + pi
t
3g
t+1
1 + δΠ
t+1
1
)
+ f t1
(
pit3g
t+1
2 + pi
t
4 + δΠ
t+1
2
)
(B.16)
Πt2 = g
t
2
(
pit2 + pi
t
3g
t+1
1 + δΠ
t+1
1
)
+ f t2
(
pit3g
t+1
2 + pi
t
4 + δΠ
t+1
2
)
(B.17)
From the first order condition, (B.14), pit2 +pit3gt1 + δΠ
t+1
1 = 0 and, hence, the
envelope conditions for this problem are:
Πt1 = pi
t
1 + f
t
1
(
pit3g
t+1
2 + pi
t
4 + δΠ
t+1
2
)
(B.18)
Πt2 = f
t
2
(
pit3g
t+1
2 + pi
t
4 + δΠ
t+1
2
)
(B.19)
Now to solve, first substitute (B.15) into (B.18) to give
−pi
t−1
2 + pi
t−1
3 g
t−1
1
δ
= pit1 + f
t
1
(
pit3g
t+1
2 + pi
t
4 + δΠ
t+1
2
)
(B.20)
which rearranges to
Πt+12 = −
pit−12 + pi
t−1
3 g
t−1
1 + δpi
t
1
δ2f t1
− pi
t
3g
t+1
2 + pi
t
4
δ
. (B.21)
Now substituting (B.21) into (B.19) eliminates the unknown Bellman value
function derivative:
− pi
t−2
2 + pi
t−2
3 g
t−2
1 + δpi
t−1
1
δ2f t−11
− pi
t−1
3 g
t
2 + pi
t−1
4
δ
= −f t2
pit−12 + pi
t−1
3 g
t−1
1 + δpi
t
1
δf t1
(B.22)
This, shifted forward two periods, simplifies to give equation (4.10).
Appendix C
Numerical results of
linear-quadratic example
Included in this appendix are the raw results of the computations from
Chapter 5.
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Appendix D
Hyperbolic discounting
equilibrium derivations
D.1 First best regulation
Equations (6.15) and (6.8) can be combined to give lifetime welfare from
the viewpoint of the period-0 regulator:
W0 = w(x0, k0) + βδw(x1, θk0 + x0) + βδ
2w(x2, x1 + θx0 + θ
2k0) + . . . (D.1)
Maximising this function requires taking first-order conditions with re-
spect to xt ∀t ≥ 0. Derivatives are notated as usual with the time super-
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script taken from the time subscript of the state variable.
∂W0
∂x0
= w01 + βδw
1
2 + θβδ
2w22 + . . . = 0 (D.2)
∂W0
∂x1
= βδw11 + θβδ
2w22 + θβδ
3w32 + . . . = 0 (D.3)
∂W0
∂x2
= βδ2w21 + θβδ
3w32 + θβδ
4w42 + . . . = 0 (D.4)
... (D.5)
Compacting these conditions, (D.2)−(D.3)×θ gives
w01 + βδ
(
w12 − θw11
)
= 0, (D.6)
and ((D.4)−(D.6)×θ)/βδ gives
wt1 + δ
(
wt+12 − θwt+11
)
= 0 ∀ t ≥ 2. (D.7)
D.2 Second best regulation
The current period’s first-order condition for welfare maximisation is
wt1 + βδV
t+1
1 = 0 (D.8)
∴ V t+11 = −
wt1
βδ
. (D.9)
Differentiating (6.27) gives
V t1 = w
t
1f
t
1 + w
t
2 + δV
t+1
1 (θf
t
1) (D.10)
and substituting in equation (D.9) gives the Euler-Lagrange equation:
wt1 + βδ(w
t+1
1 f
t+1
1 + w
t+1
2 )− δ(θ + f t+11 )wt+11 = 0. (D.11)
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D.3 The regulation game
D.3.1 The regulator’s problem
To solve for the generalised Euler equation that characterises the welfare
maximising price path we first take first order conditions:
wt3 + βδV
t+1
1 = 0 (D.12)
∴ V t+11 = −
wt3
βδ
. (D.13)
Taking the envelope conditions for this problem from equation (6.32) gives
V t1 = w
t
1h
t
1 + w
t
3g
t
1 + w
t
4 + δ
[
V t+11 g
t
1 + V
t+1
2 h
t
1
]
(D.14)
V t2 = w
t
1h
t
2 + w
t
2 + w
t
3g
t
2 + δ
[
V t+11 g
t
2 + V
t+1
2
(
θ + ht2
)]
. (D.15)
Solving for the Euler-Lagrange equation: (D.13)→ (D.14) gives
wt1h
t
1 + w
t
3g
t
1 + w
t
4 −
wt3g
t
1
β
+ δV t+12 h
t
1 +
wt−13
βδ
= 0 (D.16)
∴ V t+12 =
wt3g
t
1
βδht1
− w
t
1h
t
1 + w
t
3g
t
1 + w
t
4
δht1
− w
t−1
3
βδ2ht1
(D.17)
Now (D.13), (D.16)→ (D.15) gives the result
wt−13 g
t−1
1 − β
(
wt−11 h
t−1
1 + w
t−1
3 g
t−1
1 + w
t−1
4
)
δht−11
− w
t−2
3
δ2ht−11
= β(wt1h
t
2 + w
t
2 + w
t
3g
t
2)− gt2wt3
+
(θ + ht2)
ht1
[
wt3g
t
1 − β
(
wt1h
t
1 + w
t
3g
t
1 + w
t
4
)− wt−13
δ
]
. (D.18)
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D.3.2 The monopolist’s problem
The first order condition of this problem is
pit1 + δΠ
t+1
2 = 0 (D.19)
∴ Πt+12 = −
pit1
δ
. (D.20)
The envelope conditions for this problem are
Πt1 = pi
t
2g
t
1 + δΠ
t+1
1 g
t
1, (D.21)
Πt2 = pi
t
2g
t
2 + δΠ
t+1
1 g
t
2 + θδΠ
t+1
2 . (D.22)
Solving for the Euler equation: (D.20)→(D.21) gives
−pi
t−1
1
δ
= pit2g
t
2 − θpit1 + δΠt+11 gt2 (D.23)
Πt+11 =
θpit1 − pit2gt2 − 1δpit−11
δgt2
. (D.24)
Now, (D.24)→(D.22) yields the Euler-Lagrange equation:
pit2g
t
1 +
gt1
gt2
(
θpit1 − pit2gt2 −
1
δ
pit−11
)
− θpi
t−1
1 − pit−12 gt−12 − 1δpit−21
δgt−12
= 0 (D.25)
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